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A B S T R A C T
The aviation and livestock agriculture sectors are major producers of greenhouse gas emissions, and have been
the subject of extensive examination to develop lower impact, more energy and resource eﬃcient technologies.
Yet little attention has been paid to the challenges faced in the adoption of these lower impact technologies in
these industry sectors. In this paper we seek to understand the interactions between technological innovation
and socio-behavioural contexts in the adoption of more environmentally sustainable practices. Focusing on the
UK (although recognising the global context of aviation and agriculture) and using a combination of literature
analysis and interview data we undertake a detailed examination of these interactions. We examine why the
claims of eco-modernisation theory that argue that the drive for economic eﬃciency will lead also to improved
energy and resource eﬃciency appear unfounded in our cases. We identify lock-in in both sectors, ﬁnding that
the barriers to greener innovation hinge particularly on the knowledge practices that pertain in the two sectors.
This ‘epistemic lock-in’, rather than simple inertia and resistance to unfamiliarity, appears crucial, and must be
overcome to enable adoption of lower impact technologies.
1. Introduction
Towards the end of the twentieth century a scientiﬁc consensus
emerged pointing towards a strong causal correlation between green-
house gases (GHGs) and climate change, and in most countries this view
is accepted by mainstream political opinion. In the United Kingdom
(UK), policy responses to this challenge led to an ambitious target of
reducing GHGs emissions by 80% by 2050 as compared to 1990 levels
[1].
Achieving such challenging goals will require the transformation of
many industrial sectors. Whether it be automobiles running on fossil
fuels, poorly insulated houses, fuel-hungry aircraft, or meat consump-
tion based on ruminant farm animals, it is clear that longstanding
technological paradigms need to be displaced or drastically altered.
Innovation can provide technologies with less climate change impact,
but they must also be adopted into practice to produce this eﬀect.
Although ‘eco-modernisation’ has many conceptual strands, one key
idea is that businesses seek to be eﬃcient in order to make greater
proﬁts, and such eﬃciency should lead to less wasteful use of resources
and greater energy-eﬃciency. This ‘win-win’ argument is also central to
the claims made for ‘clean technology’ whereby innovative
restructuring of industrial processes can reduce waste production, thus
reducing the need for end-of-pipe approaches to ameliorate pollution.
Here we focus speciﬁcally on the processes of innovation in two
socio-technical systems – civil aviation and ruminant farming – and the
barriers to change that need to be overcome to improve energy and
resource eﬃciency to order to achieve substantial GHG reduction.
These two sectors are chosen for their distinctive individual signiﬁcance
and the potential they aﬀord for comparative analysis. To what extent,
do these cases support or undermine the argument that eco-moder-
nisation can lead to win-win outcomes by stimulating the adoption of
more energy eﬃcient processes? What factors limit the adoption of
more eﬃciency due to the ‘lock-in’ of existing socio-technical systems?
How do these factors diﬀer between the two sectors under comparison
here, and what policy measures can help overcome this lock-in?
2. Eco-modernisation, environmental transitions, and lock-in
In broad terms eco-modernisation theory (EMT) views ‘the constant
ecological restructuring of modernity’ as suﬃcient to meet environ-
mental challenges because of the inherent ‘ecology-inspired and en-
vironment-induced processes of transformation and reform in the
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central institutions and social practices of modern society’ [2,255].
There are a broad range of critiques of EMT (e.g. [3,4]). Here we focus
on one particular aspect: the centrality of technological innovation to
the achievement of more eﬃcient and thus greener solutions. A core
idea of EMT is that ‘the only possible way out of the ecological crisis is
by going further into the process of modernization’ [5,42]. At the heart
of this optimistic perspective is the belief that technological innovation
can, and will, improve resource eﬃciency, and that in so doing eco-
nomic gains and corporate proﬁt will be aligned with reductions in
environmental impacts. As Welford [6,3] puts it: ‘Eco-modernism as a
philosophy, with eco-eﬃciency as its ﬂagship tool, represents a re-
sponse to concern over the environment by those people and institu-
tions who are committed to the traditional modernist growth trend. The
tool of eco-eﬃciency, a broadly technological tool, sees no alternative
to business setting the environmental agenda and business controlling
the greening of development.’
Thus, according to EMT, technology is the solution, not the pro-
blem, and ‘clean(er) technology’ oﬀers ‘win-win’ solutions [7]. In this
perspective, so long as environmental costs over the whole life cycle are
internalised, the proﬁt maximising nature of capitalist economies will
drive down environmental damage whilst increasing proﬁts. EMT thus
seeks to ‘solve environmental problems by making capitalism less
wasteful and thus more sustainable, while retaining the basic system of
capitalist production and consumption. The approach to environmental
problems is therefore eﬃciency-oriented’ [8,pp. 3–4].
However, such a benign view of market-driven innovation rests on a
neo-classical view of economics in which technological substitution
relies simply on straightforward cost-beneﬁt analysis, and where new
technology can be readily accessed and exploited by companies. In
reality, certain aspects of innovation do not follow this idealised model.
Rather than constantly seeking to maximise eﬃciency (and proﬁts),
companies instead ‘satisﬁce’ by following routines that usually provide
adequate ﬁnancial returns [9,10]. Moreover, technologies are not
readily and smoothly substitutable: in some cases because of the high
R&D costs needed to develop new technologies to the point where they
can out-perform existing technologies that have beneﬁtted from years
of incremental improvement, but more generally because technologies
are embedded in broader ‘socio-technical regimes’. Moreover, as we
will outline in both our case studies, environmental impacts can be
multiple, complex, and not directly related to energy or resource eﬃ-
ciency.
A particular barrier for eﬃciency incentives to drive radical im-
provements in environmental performance is that socio-technical re-
gimes are typically persistent, and characterised by ‘technological tra-
jectories’ in which paradigmatic technologies are gradually improved.
As Dosi [11,153] noted, ‘a technological paradigm has a powerful ex-
clusion eﬀect: the eﬀorts and the technological imagination of en-
gineers and of the organisations they are in are focused in rather precise
directions while they are, so to speak, “blind” with respect of other
technological possibilities.’
Dosi’s emphasis on technical exemplars and engineers’ practices was
too narrow, and later thinking on regimes emphasises ‘the embedding
of existing technologies in broader technical systems, in production
practices and routines, consumption patterns, engineering and man-
agement belief systems, and cultural values’ [12,182]. In recent years,
the dominant framework applied to understanding the persistence of
such regimes has focussed on ‘technological transitions’, typically
through application of the multi-level perspective (MLP) approach (e.g.
[13,14]).
Many interesting historical case studies have been produced using
the MLP framework, but this approach has also attracted a range of
critiques (e.g. [15,16]). Our concerns about the MLP approach to
transitions centre on two issues. First, many of these studies are limited
by a tendency to focus on the development of technology more than on
its use, on the supply-side rather than the demand-side [17]. Second,
MLP transition case studies are dominated by accounts of successful
transitions (for an exception, see [18]). Because MLP accounts of
transitions ‘have a tendency to focus on “winning” technologies’ [15:
1444] they suﬀer from a lack of methodological symmetry as regards
explaining success and failure [19].
While the MLP has dominated recent work on transitions, studies of
lock-in have been relatively neglected, and yet they oﬀer a useful cor-
rective to this focus on successful transitions. Understanding lock-in is a
key step towards overcoming barriers to more sustainable systems [20].
The concept of lock-in theorises two speciﬁc mechanisms – ‘increasing
returns’ and ‘network externalities’ – that account for the persistence of
socio-technical regimes.
‘Increasing returns’ draws on the idea of ‘learning by doing’ [21]
whereby chosen technologies get locked in because ‘the more they are
adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the more they
are improved’ [22,116]. Arthur [22,116] thus argues that ‘a technology
that by chance gains an early lead in adoption may eventually “corner
the market” of potential adopters, with the other technologies be-
coming locked out.’ The signiﬁcance for environmental transitions is
clear, as Unruh [23,817], for example, claims that ‘industrial economies
have become locked into fossil fuel-based technological systems
through a path-dependent process driven by technological and in-
stitutional increasing returns to scale.’
The second concept underpinning lock-in hinges on the role of
network externalities and has been developed by David – though he did
not use this term in his 1985 paper – with his iconic case of the
QWERTY keyboard. David [24,334] argues that the history of QWERTY
shows that what is now considered an inferior technology remains
locked in because of ‘technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and
quasi-irreversibility of investment’ (his italics). In other words, there was
a strong linkage between the choice of typewriter keyboard and the
expertise to type on it quickly, the more that one keyboard design
dominated, the more it paid to be skilful in its use, and once such a
large stock of keyboards and of people skilled in their use existed, it
became increasingly hard for a competitor to gain traction.
Together, these two concepts provide a framework for under-
standing path-dependence, explaining how a particular technological
approach can be locked-in, and others locked-out. Accounts of lock-in
include the light water nuclear reactor [25], the gasoline car [26], and,
of particular relevance to our case of ruminant farming, pest control in
agriculture [27].
However, the classic economic explanations of lock-in take a black-
boxed view of technology, neglecting the speciﬁc technological prac-
tices of the ‘epistemic cultures’ [28] involved. In particular, the catch-
all term of ‘increasing returns’ (which [29] later disaggregated into
‘scale economies’, ‘learning eﬀects’, and ‘adaptive expectations’) covers
a range of kinds of investment, but does not suﬃciently un-pick the
crucial role of knowledge in socio-technical lock-in.
Shove and Walker [17] argue that practices play an important role
in transitions in creating demand, but our contention is that knowledge
practices are also key to the adoption of technology. We therefore
propose a category of lock-in focussed on the knowledge involved in the
development, diﬀusion and enactment of the technological practices
that constrain innovation. We argue that fully understanding lock-in
requires us to look at the socio-technical practices involved in both
development and implementation. In particular, we will investigate the
extent to which knowledge-intensive practices constrain technological
choice, producing what we call epistemic lock-in.
Our central hypothesis is that lock-in happens in ways that are
speciﬁc to the knowledge practices that prevail in a particular socio-
technical regime. According to Knorr-Cetina [30,362] ‘epistemic cul-
tures can be seen as a structural feature of knowledge societies’ in
which knowledge can develop and be applied in local contexts rather
than being universal in nature. This means that there can be ‘divides
between global knowledge and its expert cultures and social groups,
and those areas of practice and mentality that remain local’ [30,372].
Although Knorr-Cetina focuses on scientists and their practices (for
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example, in laboratories), we argue that the creation and utilisation of
knowledge throughout society is also crucial to environmental transi-
tions. This means that there are no universal, generic solutions to lock-
in; each case must be addressed separately to understand the role
played by knowledge in embedding and sustaining path-dependence.
We demonstrate this phenomenon through two distinct case studies
that also show the limitations of eco-modernisation in driving en-
vironmental improvement through proﬁt-driven eﬃciency gains.
3. Methods
This paper draws on research from two separate UK Economic and
Social Research Council funded projects, providing case studies of lock-
in in two distinct sectors – aviation and ruminant agriculture – con-
ducted by Spinardi and Bruce respectively. These case studies and their
comparative analysis draw on 57 semi-structured interviews,1 and ex-
tensive literature reviews, including specialist technical documents.
Further details on methods can be found in [31–33].
The focus of each study was on technology adoption and involved
detailed accounts of existing socio-technical arrangements in each
sector as well as of alternative greener approaches. In what follows we
describe for each case study: the key characteristics of the socio-tech-
nical system as regards its environmental impacts: potential solutions
for mitigation; and the barriers to these solutions. After setting out our
two case studies, we then compare the two, particularly in respect of
lock-in mechanisms.
4. Case study 1: aviation
4.1. Environmental impacts
Historically, environmental concerns with aviation focussed on
local impacts (emissions and especially noise), and on the impact of
airport building on amenity. Such local environmental concerns are
now overshadowed by the much greater global consequences attributed
to climate change. Many see air travel as an unnecessary activity that
causes great environmental damage. However, it is also a popular,
substantive part of the economy, and there seems little prospect that
environmental angst alone will curb, never mind reverse, its growth.
Oﬃcial 2012 ﬁgures show UK aviation carrying around 235 million
passengers per year, along with 2.3 million tonnes of freight.2 UK
aviation CO2 emissions are expected to grow from 37.5 Mt CO2 in 2005
to between 40 and 59 Mt CO2 in 2050 (with a central estimate of 49 Mt
CO2) [34,10], though UK policy is aimed at ‘reducing CO2 emissions
from UK aviation down to, or below, 2005 levels by 2050’ [34,3].
Carbon dioxide is not aviation’s only contributor to climate change.
Contrails (condensation trails) and contrail-induced clouds are also
thought to produce warming (there is uncertainty about how much, but
it is generally thought to be at least as much as that produced by aircraft
CO2 emissions), but these only last for hours in the troposphere. It
should be noted that while most environmental impacts of air travel are
directly related to energy (fuel) eﬃciency, this is not the case for the
production of contrails, and in some cases routes chosen to reduce
contrail formation would use more fuel than otherwise [35].
Despite ﬂuctuations in the oil price, fuel is a signiﬁcant operating
cost and this means that ‘airlines have an enormous built-in incentive to
reduce consumption’ [36,1]. Fuel eﬃciency has improved considerably
over the years, with, for example, US airlines tripling their fuel eﬃ-
ciency (in terms of passenger-miles per gallon) between 1971 and 2005
[36,2]. Some of this improvement has come from better operational
practices (e.g. cruising longer at higher altitudes with short, steep ap-
proaches), but the replacement of older aircraft with newer more eﬃ-
cient designs has made the biggest contribution.
4.2. Potential solutions
Aviation’s environmental impacts could be lowered if demand for
ﬂying was reduced, either by making it more expensive (through
taxation) and/or by making alternatives (e.g. high-speed rail) cheaper
and/or more available. However, building high-speed rail can be poli-
tically diﬃcult and expensive, and the environmental beneﬁts may be
marginal for some routes – especially if there are signiﬁcant physical
obstacles involved [37]. Using taxation to increase the cost of ﬂying can
be problematic because of the international nature of aviation. Where
an airport is simply a transit point then local taxation may simply lead
to pollution (and business) being transferred elsewhere with no global
environmental beneﬁt. The UK taxes departures from UK airports
through Air Passenger Duty (APD) levied on individual passengers ac-
cording to ﬂight distance bands. Clearly, as UK air travel has continued
to grow since the introduction of APD in 1994, current levels of taxation
have a limited eﬀect on behaviour.
Apart from reducing the number of ﬂights, the potential ways of
reducing aviation’s climate change impact fall into three categories:
more eﬃcient aircraft designs to reduce fuel usage and therefore GHG
emissions; switching to the use of biofuels, if sources could be found
that did not produce damaging environmental or social side-eﬀects; and
more eﬃcient aircraft operation, particularly through the use of air
traﬃc management (ATM) to reduce the conﬂicts that cause delays and
inhibit fuel-eﬃcient trajectories [32]. For reasons of brevity, we will
focus here on the potential for, and obstacles to, radical innovation in
airliner design.
Airliners have become much more fuel-eﬃcient over the last ﬁfty
years – although the ﬁrst ‘jet’ airliners such as the Boing 707 were
vastly less eﬃcient than the propeller-engined airliners they replaced.
Over this period technological advances have reduced emissions by
around 70% per passenger/mile, though overall emissions have risen as
many more people ﬂy. Over the decade up to 2011 an increase in
aviation traﬃc of 45% was managed with only a 3% increase in fuel use
[38]. However, incremental improvements in the classic airliner design
‘are rapidly nearing the limits of what conventional technology can do’
[38]. About 40% of airliners currently in service were built in the
previous century [39]. Some progress can be made by replacing them
with fuel-eﬃcient designs, but achieving the UK targets for GHG re-
ductions will require new, greener aircraft.
Improvements in airliner fuel eﬃciency can be achieved in three
ways: by making aircraft lighter, by adopting more aerodynamic de-
signs, and by making engines more eﬃcient. The most obvious ap-
proach to trim excess weight is to use lighter-weight materials such as
carbon ﬁbre rather than aluminium. Although carbon ﬁbre has been
used in military aircraft since the 1970s, it is only now ﬁnding sub-
stantive structural use in airliners, notably in the Boeing 787 [33].
Additive manufacturing processes may also hold potential for reducing
emissions [40].
‘Dead’ weight can also be removed by the use of designs that
minimise structure that does not provide lift. The ultimate expression of
this is a ‘ﬂying wing’ design in which the whole aircraft structure
provides lift, maximising the lift-to-drag ratio by eliminating the fu-
selage. Aerodynamic performance could also be enhanced, for ﬂying
wing designs as well as conventional ones, by using laminar ﬂow con-
trol (LFC) to minimise drag. As air ﬂows over a wing it quickly becomes
turbulent, and this turbulence greatly increases drag. However, it has
long been known that it is possible to maintain laminar ﬂow, and thus
1 These interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity but the aviation inter-
viewees comprised engineers and managers from both NASA and major aerospace com-
panies, while the agriculture interviewees were 30 sheep and beef cattle farmers and 12
industry actors (e.g. veterinarians, meat processors, breeding advisors). The diﬀering
numbers of interviewees for the two cases reﬂect the diﬀering methodologies of the
original projects, with the aviation project focusing on key participants to trace the de-
velopment of greener aviation technology, while the agriculture project adopted a pur-
posive sampling approach. Furthermore, as farmers are very heterogeneous, larger
numbers of interviewees were needed to reach thematic saturation.
2 http://www.dft.gov.uk/aviation. (Accessed 4 December 2012).
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reduce drag, through suction from within the wing surface. Together
with the use of a ﬂying wing type design, it is thought that LFC could
reduce fuel use by 50% [41,51].
Finally, fuel eﬃciency can be enhanced through the use of more
eﬃcient engines. Current turbofan engines are more eﬃcient than
earlier designs (and much more eﬃcient than the ﬁrst turbojet engines),
but turboprop engines oﬀer even greater eﬃciency. Increased fuel
prices resulting from the 1973 oil crisis led NASA to carry out an R&D
programme (the Advanced Turboprop Project) that ran from 1978 to
1987. However, although turboprops capable of speeds suitable for
intercontinental airliners were developed by General Electric and Pratt
& Whitney, commercial uptake did not follow [42,43].
4.3. Lock-in and barriers to transition
There is thus a history of greener aviation technologies that have
only been used partly (turboprop engines in some short-haul airliners),
belatedly (carbon ﬁbre), or hardly at all (ﬂying wings and LFC). To
what extent are these potentially greener aviation technologies held
back by lock-in? Given the potential for radical technological im-
provement, why is airliner innovation mainly incremental?
The key challenge is to bring radically greener airliner technology to
market in a commercially-viable form. In one regard, this is a simple
innovation system. There are few producers (Boeing and Airbus for
large airliners), and if they produced a much greener airliner then its
‘diﬀusion’ would be straightforward if the customers (airline companies
and ultimately passengers) were prepared to use the ﬁnal product. As
largely ‘black-boxed’ technologies, airliners do not depend on user-
implementation to achieve most of their performance (though en-
vironmental impact per passenger-mile depends on the numbers of
passengers packed in).
However, the airliner innovation system discourages radical in-
novation because developing a new airliner is expensive and a sig-
niﬁcant product failure (particularly as regards customer acceptance)
would be commercially disastrous. As a former Boeing engineer put it,
there is an initial cost to design or ‘draw’ a new airliner that ‘you cannot
overcome because of all of the data requirements to certify an aircraft’
so that ‘once you draw this aeroplane you’ve incurred this cost, and …
you’re locked in.’ Airliner development is thus risk-averse for com-
mercial reasons, and this is reinforced by the particular safety culture of
civil aviation. Accidents are bad for business, and all participants have a
shared interest in avoiding them [44].
The new Boeing 787 airliner is estimated to have cost around $15
billion to develop, and with such high development costs, it is crucial
that a new airliner is both technically and commercially successful.
Making a technology that works, at a reasonable cost, is not the only
concern facing aircraft manufacturers. Every new aircraft must not only
be acceptable to the customers – airline operators and the travelling
public – it must also be certiﬁed as safe by the regulatory authorities.
American aircraft certiﬁcation is carried out by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) (working with its European counterpart). The
FAA’s certiﬁcation process seeks to promote innovation and so its
‘regulations do not constrain designers a priori by specifying details
such as material properties or the design of individual structures.
Instead, designers are given a free hand to incorporate new materials,
structural concepts, etc., so long as they accept the responsibility for
showing that systems with innovative design features meet the FAA’s
stringent reliability requirements’ [45,12].
However, this certiﬁcation process has become increasingly chal-
lenging as the complexity of aircraft design has increased. A compre-
hensive account of the process [43,38] noted that:
… a major airframe manufacturer may employ as many as 8000
engineers, ﬂight test pilots and inspectors to design, develop, and
certiﬁcate a new wide-body passenger jet. … The number of labor
hours invested by a manufacturer in designing a large new jet may
be several hundred times greater than the number of labor hours the
FAA has available to verify the safety of the aircraft design.
The FAA gets round this problem by co-opting aircraft engineers to
self-regulate, and by drawing on the past record of the aircraft manu-
facturers and their aircraft [44]. Certiﬁcation rests crucially on
knowledge and expertise built up over many decades, and several
generations of aircraft. This cumulative knowledge base facilitates
certiﬁcation because incremental innovation allows extrapolation from
earlier knowledge claims (either empirical, say, from wind tunnel
testing or theoretical), and from the proven track record of aircraft that
have been in operation for decades:
Reliability assessments of new civil aircraft lean very heavily on
inferences from the – statistically well-established – data from ear-
lier, diﬀerent, aircraft designs. … Large civil aircraft change only
very incrementally between generations. Innovations are extremely
modest, with new technologies being withheld until their reliability
has been well-established in other contexts (in military aircraft, for
instance) [46,27].
If new designs diverged radically from this knowledge base, certi-
ﬁcation would be more problematic, and riskier for the airliner devel-
oper. This conservative innovation process is the main barrier to radi-
cally greener airliner technology. However, the case of carbon ﬁbre
composites shows that more radical change is possible [33]. Following
its invention in the 1960s, high-strength carbon ﬁbre was taken up for
use in military aircraft ﬁrst, and then in small non-structural roles in
civil aircraft.
Despite this history of use, the high levels of structural composites
found in the Boeing 787 (about 50% by weight) have raised concerns.
In a 2007 letter3 to the FAA, former Boeing engineer Vincent Weldon
noted that aluminium has ‘far fewer failure modes’ than carbon ﬁbre
and that a particular concern about the latter was that ‘there is far less
proven knowledge than for aluminium structure’. Weldon argued that
‘the less mature composite structure data base, compared to that of
aluminium, is of concern’. A 2011 investigation by the US General
Accountability Oﬃce concurred:
These concerns are partly attributable to the limited in-service ex-
perience with composite materials used in the airframe structures of
commercial airplanes and, therefore, less information is available on
the behaviour of these materials than on the behaviour of metal
[47,28].
Nevertheless, the GAO report concluded that the FAA’s certiﬁcation
process had been satisfactory, citing expert opinion ‘that while not
every risk can be known, the use of composites is not revolutionary;
rather, it is a new application of technology that has a history in mili-
tary and general aviation applications’ [47,28].
As this example shows, knowledge about reliability is at the heart of
airliner innovation. The conservative culture of airliner manufacturers
is shaped by their relationships with customers and regulators, but the
crucial factor limiting radical innovation is concern about the reliability
(and commercial appeal) of technology that lacks a track-record and
accumulated knowledge base. According to a former Boeing engineer,
the design process for a new airliner is ‘very dependent on who you
have. So if you have somebody who can do a ﬂying wing then, yeh,
you’ll look at a ﬂying wing because you’ve got somebody who knows
enough about it to draw one that you can analyse. If you don’t, you
never look at it.’ As he put it, ‘the fact that we have the aircraft con-
ﬁgurations today is not necessarily because they are the smartest things
in the world to build, but because of a long series of historical acci-
dents.’
Airliner technology is thus locked in by lack of knowledge,
3 http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABPub/2007/09/17/2003889769.pdf. (Accessed
5 December 2012).
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especially as regards the reliability of ‘unproven’ approaches.
Describing this simply as lock-in due to increasing returns fails to
capture fully the role of knowledge. What is important is not simply the
accumulation of a body of knowledge about reliability, but also the
reliability of this knowledge, and the social relations that inform it. It is
thus epistemic lock-in that constitutes a barrier to radical innovation in
airliner technology. As the histories of laminar ﬂow control and the
advanced turbojet show (see [16]), further R&D alone cannot ﬁll this
knowledge gap because what is lacking is operational experience.
5. Case study 2: ruminant farming
5.1. Environmental impacts
The environmental, and in particular climate change impact, of
cattle and sheep production has been widely recognised [48]. UK es-
timates are that agricultural emissions account for some 48 MtCO2e
(carbon dioxide equivalents) or 8% of UK total GHG emissions [49],
making the sector broadly comparable with aviation (at 37.5 MtCO2).
The main sources of GHGs are nitrous oxide from fertilisers and
manure, and methane from digestive systems of cattle and sheep.
About 2.1 million cattle and 14 million sheep were slaughtered in
the UK in 2010, to provide over 1.1 million tonnes of meat for human
consumption, at a farm gate value of over £3 billion [50]. The industry
sector is very heterogeneous with a range of diﬀerent production sys-
tems. For example, a simpliﬁed breakdown includes three beef pro-
duction categories (lowland suckler beef, hill and upland suckler beef,
and dairy beef), and three sheep production categories (hill ﬂocks,
upland ﬂocks and lowland ﬂocks) with baseline climate change impacts
associated with them ranging from 11 kg CO2e/kg meat (dairy beef) to
18 kg CO2e/kg meat (hill ﬂocks of sheep) [51].
The UK agricultural industry has been challenged to reduce emis-
sions as part of the overall reductions in GHG emissions [1], and is
furthermore strongly inﬂuenced by Government policy via the Eur-
opean Union’s Common Agricultural Policy. For example, the shift from
subsidies based on the number of animals to a Single Farm Payment is
claimed to have contributed to a drop in the total number of livestock
[48], and coincidentally facilitated reductions in agricultural GHG
emissions by 21% between 1990 and 2008 [49].
5.2. Potential solutions
Ruminant farming diﬀers from aviation in that there is no vision of a
radical technical paradigm-shift that could signiﬁcantly reduce GHG
emissions. Instead the potential solutions envisioned are piecemeal and
incremental in nature. Four types of action could reduce GHG emissions
from ruminant livestock: i) reduce the amount of meat produced and
consumed; ii) improve the eﬃciency of the food chain; iii) manipulate
the processes of methane production; iv) increase the meat produced
for a given amount of GHG emissions.
Reducing demand by urging consumers to eat less meat relies on
voluntary action by many individual consumers. Taxation at the point
of consumption could reduce UK demand, but because meat is traded
globally, UK producers could sell to other jurisdictions. Similarly,
taxing production could simply export the emissions. The worldwide
production of meat and milk is projected to more than double due to
increasing population size and increasing wealth [52]. Reduction in UK
meat consumption is therefore unlikely to be a panacea, though there
are opportunities to reduce food wastage.
The second approach involves addressing food chain eﬃciency. The
value chain from farm to plate is extremely complex [53], involving
multiple agents and diﬀerent conﬁgurations. For example, around 50%
of UK beef is produced as a by-product of the dairy industry (dairy cows
need to have a calf each year in order to produce milk), the remainder
coming from specialist producers. However, dairy cattle breeds produce
much less meat than those used for beef production. Some have
suggested a return to dual-purpose cattle (i.e. producing meat and milk
from the same animals which reduces the methane output for each
‘product’) – a radical change in production system – but many inter-
viewees perceived such an approach would be economically un-
competitive and have infrastructural implications that are challenging,
if not infeasible.
The third potential way to reduce ruminant GHG emissions focuses
on the methane produced by the rumen (or stomach) bacteria needed to
break down grass for digestion. Manipulating the amount of methane
produced by these bacteria could reduce GHG emissions. A range of
methods have been suggested, from using diﬀerent grass varieties, to
using feed additives, to vaccination to modify the bacterial population.
Diﬀerent methods may be appropriate in diﬀerent circumstances. For
example, interviewees noted that sheep are only given supplementary
feeds a few weeks per year and therefore feed additives may be in-
eﬀective. Similarly, some grassland is unsuitable for re-seeding due to
topography or because it is being managed to maintain biodiversity. It
is also important to note that although the above three methods for
methane reduction would be environmentally beneﬁcial, they are not
directly related to the eﬃciency of meat production, and so, like the
impact of aircraft contrails, could not be driven by eco-modernisation.
Finally, there is the potential to increase the eﬃciency of meat
production relative to GHG emissions. Options include faster growing
animals, converting feed to meat more eﬃciently, managing feed
sources and manure better, and reducing wastage due to disease and
fertility problems. Improved eﬃciency means that many of the mea-
sures currently suggested to reduce GHG emission from cattle and sheep
are viewed as beneﬁtting both emissions reductions and improved
economic performance, as would be argued by advocates of eco-mod-
ernisation. Calculation of Marginal Abatement Cost Curves [54] show
that genetic change in beef cattle aimed at greater growth rate and
eﬃciency is beneﬁcial both in reducing methane emissions and pro-
viding economic beneﬁts to farmers. Likewise, Jones et al. [55] calcu-
lated carbon footprints for sheep and concluded that measures to im-
prove productivity (e.g. lamb growth rate, number of lambs produced)
had the best potential for reducing carbon footprints. Both genetic
change in beef cattle and improved lamb growth rate can be promoted
by selective breeding, and we now focus speciﬁcally on the role of
genetic change in increasing resource eﬃciency.
Traditionally, selective breeding involved selecting animals for fu-
ture reproduction by their appearance. However, considerable techno-
logical innovation has transformed selection based on appearance to
selection on genetic merit, drawing on advances in computing power,
statistical analysis, understanding of genetics, and increasingly, use of
gene sequencing and diagnostic devices to measure characteristics that
have hitherto been impossible to measure. The current approach uses
Estimated Breeding Values (EBVs) to provide year-on-year incremental
improvements in eﬃciency and consequent reductions in GHG emis-
sions.
EBVs make use of sophisticated statistical analyses combined with
information on pedigree and measures of performance in speciﬁc
characteristics, such as growth rate. Rather than comprising a discrete
radical innovation, EBVs work at the level of small incremental changes
that gradually accumulate to large diﬀerences. For example, estimates
suggest that selection informed by EBVs in pork production led to GHG
emission reductions of 15% between 1988 and 2007 [56], although the
changes so far in beef and sheep have been estimated to be much
smaller.
Within the UK sheep and beef sectors, there are three major sup-
pliers of EBVs linked with individual breed societies that act as gate-
keepers for which animals are to be included in their books. Farmers
buy the animals associated with speciﬁc EBVs. In this way, the breed
societies act in analogous ways to regulators in aviation but with less
power; it is still possible to produce meat without involving breed so-
cieties. While an individual farmer may obtain quick improvements by
changing breed, producing genetic change requires decades of
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consistent action. The use of EBVs requires ongoing attention rather
than a one-oﬀ purchase, and is usually achieved by repeated purchase
of high EBV animals (analogous to updating computer software).
However, the purchase comprises an animal and the EBV can thus be
considered a ‘black-box’ that requires no special user implementation.
5.3. Lock-in and barriers to transition
The barriers to lower GHG producing ruminant farming stem not
from diﬃculties with the development of commercially-viable greener
technology, but rather from failure to use existing solutions. For ex-
ample, farmers experience diﬀerent barriers to the use of EBVs de-
pending on their circumstances. Key barriers include: i) limited human
resources on small farms; ii) structural issues; iii) failure to give cred-
ibility to the problem being tackled; iv) conﬂicting objectives; v) lack of
trust of external expertise.
First, unlike aircraft manufacturers, farms are often small family
enterprises with limited ability to adopt new technologies and prac-
tices. For example, several interviewees indicated that they were not in
principle against using EBVs, but simply did not have the time to en-
gage with the issue. Similarly, as one farmer noted, the methane chal-
lenges went straight into the ‘too diﬃcult’ box. In the context of family
farms, the lack of a clear successor to take on the farm also inhibited
engagement with EBVs.
Second, there are features of livestock marketing and production
that constrain the ability of an individual farmer to act in isolation.
Livestock for meat production are frequently sold from one farm to
another (often moving from upland regions to lowland regions) re-
ﬂecting the availability of grass during the year, and information is lost
during this process. Furthermore, the demands of diﬀerent actors in the
chain can vary. The breeding priorities of farmers in upland regions
may diﬀer from those of lowland farmers, who in turn may have dif-
ferent priorities from meat processors., Some information is more
readily available and therefore given greater weight (e.g. the price re-
ceived for slaughtered animals as compared to proﬁt per breeding an-
imal). Economic beneﬁts of faster growth rate are diﬃcult to demon-
strate if records are not kept and if prices at auction markets vary
unpredictably from week to week, as is often the case. Farmers’ per-
ceptions of being treated unfairly by meat processors are also a barrier
to collaboration [57], as exempliﬁed by a quote from a sheep breeder in
our research: ‘There is an instinctive distrust by the farming industry of
the major retailers’. This kind of complexity and interrelatedness leads
to the conclusion that eﬀective change to improve sustainability would
require reform of the entire production chain.
The third barrier lies in farmers’ acceptance of the problem.
Methane was not perceived as a pollutant by most beef and sheep
farmers interviewed, but rather a natural and inevitable part of live-
stock agriculture [31]. As one farmer put it, ‘my sheep… they don’t get
fed anything that makes them more gaseous, they’re just eating what’s
naturally here.’ Based on the interview sample, farmers tend to con-
ceive their activities as environmentally beneﬁcial due to the absorp-
tion of carbon dioxide by the grass eaten by sheep and cattle, and many
question whether this carbon ﬁxing is fully taken into account when
emissions are calculated.
Fourthly, potential mitigation actions may be diﬃcult to implement
because they conﬂict with other key objectives. For example, farmers
selling direct to consumers (e.g. through farm shops) see their custo-
mers as valuing local, high quality production. The traditional, often
slower-growing, breeds preferred perform well on a grass-fed diet and
in the environmental conditions prevailing in the area, but slower
growth means greater GHG emissions for a given amount of meat
produced. In the context of livestock there are factors other than EBVs
to take into account, such as the aesthetic value of an animal [58] and
the way in which the identity of a ‘good’ farmer is tied up with how
their peers evaluate the appearance of their livestock [59]. Thus a sheep
and beef farmer interviewed noted that: ‘The sheep industry is a very
strange industry, there’s all sorts of traits in breeds that have nothing to
do with economics…But when you’re involved in it, it’s not easy to
change it’.
Finally, contestation of both the issue, and of mitigation methods, is
related to distrust of expert knowledge claims. Many farmers distrusted
scientiﬁc expertise because of its perceived poor track-record (for ex-
ample in dealing with animal disease outbreaks) and the apparent lack
of appreciation of practical constraints faced by farmers (see also [60]).
Thus, one farmer noted that: ‘Agriculture has always been pretty quick
to take on board new things that were deemed to be good, but we’ve
had quite a lot of stuﬀ come at us that’s … turned out to be bad.’
This distrust of expertise is particularly signiﬁcant in limiting the
uptake of EBVs. Although widely adopted in some areas of the industry,
many farmers doubt the applicability of EBVs to their situation. The
gains from EBVs were frequently perceived to be only achievable in
intensive and favourable lowland conditions. Farmers in upland and hill
conditions require their stock to thrive in harsh environments, sur-
viving with poor grass growth, rain, wind and lower temperatures, and
they did not think EBVs would be useful in such challenging conditions.
As one farmer put it: ‘For me, on this type of land, it’s not going to be
appropriate because if I go and buy statistically the very best bull or
sheep from a mart and I bring it here, it’s just not going to perform’.
Another sheep farmer had experience of using EBVs, but found them
wanting: ‘For several years I did go and select [sheep] slightly on the
look of them but it was mainly on performance. I brought them here [to
this hill environment] and thought they did really badly’. It should
perhaps be noted that the farmer’s evaluation was on the basis of visual
assessment as they did not weigh any animals.
There are potential risks associated with investing in ‘new’ strains of
livestock with higher EBVs, and little incentive to experiment with
something that might be ‘less than the best’ [27,523]. These animals
may not be able to thrive or even survive in the prevailing conditions as
well as the farmers’ current animals. However, our interviews suggest
that farmers are willing to experiment with diﬀerent breeds (not always
successfully) and appear attracted to buying-in clearly identiﬁed attri-
butes associated with the new breed. While the reasons for this cannot
be assessed with any certainty, it may be that breeds provide innovation
in a single, identiﬁable packet that ﬁts in with traditions of herd im-
provements, whereas the incremental change promised by EBVs is un-
dervalued, perhaps because it incorporates disembodied scientiﬁc
knowledge.
Although ruminant farming is quite diﬀerent from aviation in its
characteristics, both sectors have knowledge-laden activities at their
core. The way in which farmers and farming communities gain
knowledge predisposes them towards particular forms of livestock
management. In particular, the example of EBV uptake (or the lack of
it) shows that farmers’ existing knowledge-practices do not easily admit
knowledge from diﬀerent domains. In farmers’ reluctance to adopt
EBVs we also see innovation held back by ‘epistemic lock-in’. The un-
certainty about whether EBVs will provide beneﬁts in all conditions,
along with doubts over whether scientiﬁc advice is correct, result in
what Cowan and Gunby [27,523] term lock-in due to ‘uncertainty re-
duction’. If farmers are unsure whether a real problem exists and
whether the actions suggested to mitigate the problem are likely to be
eﬀective, then there are few incentives to change current practices.
6. Discussion
Both the aviation and ruminant agriculture sectors produce sig-
niﬁcant levels of GHG emissions, yet they vary enormously in their
characteristics as highlighted in Table 1.
The two sectors are very diﬀerent with high-tech artiﬁce and few
producers of aircraft in the one case, and low-tech ‘natural’ production
undertaken by a large number of small independent producers in
widely varying environments in the other. Despite these diﬀerences, a
detailed analysis of potential pathways to sustainability demonstrates
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some similarities, with the following characteristics in both cases:
• Not all of the environmental impacts are directly related to energy
or resource eﬃciency, as would be necessary for eco-modernisation
to address climate change.
• It is unlikely that constraining consumption will restrict emissions
adequately. Indeed both sectors are expected to grow rapidly glob-
ally due to increasing demand, and taxation to moderate demand
may result in movement of activity to other jurisdictions rather than
reducing demand per se.
• Perceived consumer acceptability limits the range of actions pos-
sible.
• Signiﬁcant improvements in eﬃciency could be made with existing
cutting-edge technology, but there are complex barriers to adoption.
Our focus in both these cases is to what extent these barriers can be
understood in terms of the lock-in mechanisms of increasing returns
and network externalities, or whether knowledge ﬂows are so central as
to cause what we term epistemic lock-in. Although the sectors are very
diﬀerent in many regards, it is these knowledge practices that are key to
environmental transitions in our case studies. In aviation, with its high-
tech centralised and highly regulated innovation system, the key
knowledge practices are those surrounding the safety certiﬁcation
process. In ruminant agriculture, with a more dispersed and localised
production process, it is the relationships between farmers and sources
of knowledge that are key. A focus on ‘epistemic lock-in’ highlights the
importance of knowledge practices and relationships, and goes beyond
the classic ‘increasing returns’ approach to lock-in.
Thus, airliner innovation is characterised by a conservative ap-
proach that prioritises reliability (and hence passenger safety) and
limits the commercial risk involved in the expensive process of devel-
oping new aircraft. Although other factors are involved, the central
issue is that safety certiﬁcation rests on a cumulative knowledge base –
built up over decades of testing and use – that enables extrapolation
from past to future designs. The airliner innovation system is thus
locked-in at the development stage, with radical, greener technologies
not reaching commercial production because there is insuﬃcient
knowledge about their reliability [16].
There are network externalities eﬀects (e.g. existing airports are
designed for aircraft of a particular shape and weight and may be un-
suitable for heavy, ﬂying wing designs), and also lock-in resulting from
increasing returns as the incremental improvement of the paradigmatic
airliner design (a fuselage with swept wings powered by turbofan en-
gines) has gained from decades of investment and operation. The recent
introduction of carbon ﬁbre as a structural material shows that this
lock-in can be overcome when suﬃcient knowledge exists to facilitate
the certiﬁcation of new airliner technology. However, this is not
straightforward as what counts as ‘suﬃcient’ knowledge depends as
much on the relationship between the regulator (the FAA) and the
aircraft manufacturers, as it does on ‘hard’ data [44,46]. What matters
is not just the accumulation of knowledge relating to reliability, but also
the practices and relationships that link this knowledge to regulators
such as the FAA. The challenge for overcoming this ‘epistemic lock-in’
of aviation technology thus lies not just in supporting potentially
greener technologies, but also in enhancing the knowledge ﬂows sur-
rounding such radical innovations. Policies aimed at ‘pump-priming’
innovation through R&D will thus be insuﬃcient to drive environ-
mental improvements unless they are accompanied by measures to
acquire and transfer the appropriate reliability information for reg-
ulatory approval.
Our account of ruminant farming likewise shows epistemic lock-in,
but manifested in a diﬀerent way. In the livestock agriculture sector,
farmers have strong motivations for retaining practices they personally
trust to work, and there is inertia against approaches involving high
levels of uncertainty. Local knowledge gained over generations tends to
trump scientiﬁc advice with farmers sceptical of claims about farming’s
GHG contribution, and about the practical eﬃcacy of EBVs.
Adoption of scientiﬁc breeding techniques based on EBVs requires
beef and sheep farmers to trust external evaluations. However, given
the varied nature of the UK natural environment, the predominance of
beef and sheep rearing in some of the more demanding areas, and the
strong emphasis given by farmers to the capability of their stock to
thrive under speciﬁc environmental conditions, this trust in externally
evaluated animals is often lacking. The epistemic lock-in of ruminant
farming thus hinges on the locally-embedded practices of farmers and
their complex relationships with diﬀerent types and sources of knowl-
edge claims. Overcoming this epistemic lock-in again requires en-
hanced knowledge ﬂows from innovative niches (in this case, farmers
who have adopted innovative practices and who can demonstrate their
practical application and impact). The mechanisms for these knowledge
ﬂows may require a range of diﬀerent actions, for example extension
services, demonstration farms, facilitation of movement of farmers be-
tween diﬀerent livestock sectors and countries.
Our comparative analysis of the commercial aviation and livestock
agriculture sectors suggests that transformations to more sustainable
practices cannot be driven purely by ‘green’ innovation, even when this
is successfully supported in niches. Rather wider adoption of these
technologies depends on knowledge practices and the reduction of risks
of adoption. This suggests that in both cases, policies to enable ‘safe’
spaces to explore new methods of production will be eﬀective in en-
abling change only if knowledge thus gained is eﬀectively transferred to
key actors. Such policies need to go beyond traditional R&D support in
order to ensure that experience is gained under realistic conditions,
without the full risks implicit in widespread adoption of technologies,
and that this experience generates knowledge in a form that is useful for
the speciﬁc needs of the sector in question.
Our cases also indicate that we cannot rely on eco-modernisation to
reduce environmental impacts through eﬃciency gains. Not only so
some climate change eﬀects (such as contrails in aviation) not have a
direct relationship to eﬃciency, but also the complex path dependence
Table 1
Characteristics of aviation and ruminant agriculture industry sectors.
Aviation Ruminant agriculture
High tech Low tech, but informed by relatively high tech processes (e.g. EBVs)
Concentrated in a few companies Dispersed with many diﬀerent producers
Science-based: high levels of R&D, funded by industry and government Most research funding from government, low priority until food price spike in 2007
Same technology can be applied globally Global industry but production inﬂuenced by local considerations
Alternative markets exist in the military sphere. Niche markets exist for local and organic production in particular
Product (travel) is delivered by a combination of technology (aeroplanes) and
infrastructure of ﬂying
Product (meat) is delivered by a combination of animal, farmer knowhow, technological input
(e.g. genetics) and a complex infrastructure of markets.
New aeroplane requires considerable capital investment Investment in replacements can be considerable relative to size of organisation. Animals can be
‘produced’ on farm.
Risk averseness due to safety and regulatory concerns Risk averseness due to climatic challenges and historically low levels of return
Public perceptions of safety important in attitudes to commercialisation of
technology
Public perceptions of ‘quality’ relate to emphasis on aesthetics by part of the industry, and forms a
high-value market sector.
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phenomena of lock-in show that the drivers (and inhibiters) of in-
novation do not conform to the neo-classical economic model. Even if
all environmental costs were internalised (which is still rarely the case),
a proﬁt-orientated approach to the environment is only likely to
achieve patchy, and mainly incremental, improvements at best.
Instead, we need policy initiatives targeted towards the knowledge
practices of speciﬁc sectors. In the case of aviation, funding basic R&D
seems futile unless it is accompanied by support for operational im-
plementation that addresses the risk-adverse nature of the industry by
building a knowledge base with regard to commercial viability and
reliability. In the case of carbon ﬁbre this operational experience was
gained through military sponsorship, but other greener aviation tech-
nologies could be supported either by programmes to build on what has
already been learnt in military applications (such as with the B2 ‘ﬂying
wing’ bomber) or with speciﬁc environmental and eﬃciency-orientated
programmes.
With regards to ruminant agriculture, and agriculture more gen-
erally, co-design of research with stakeholders is increasingly being
promoted as a way of overcoming barriers to uptake of innovations (e.g.
[61,62]). Similarly, Barbier and Elzen [62,14] advocate an approach
that ‘articulates a co-research relationship between all relevant
knowledge producers, including farmers’. This approach, drawing on
development studies, is not without criticism [64], with ensuring that
appropriate stakeholders are engaged in the best ways being a major
challenge [65]. A key aspect is to develop networks of practitioners that
enable innovation [66] and facilitate the participation of smaller and
remoter farmers, while recognising that a focus on resource eﬃciency
may not be the best way forward for everyone. Alternative approaches,
such as planting trees or changing management of grassland, may also
have substantial impacts on greenhouse gas emissions.
In summary, our key conclusion is that epistemic lock-in presents a
barrier to the uptake of greener technology in aviation and ruminant
agriculture, and that given the diverse nature of these two industries,
this is likely to be the case in other sectors. For this reason, if not others,
eco-modernisation alone cannot be relied upon to bring about en-
vironmental transformations of industries. Instead, we need policy
measures tailored to the speciﬁc knowledge practices of each sector.
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